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1. Introduction
Formore than a century now, states have intervened strongly to alleviate the social
and economic consequences of crises in capitalism.Newmodels of regulation, such
as Keynesianism, have been invented to deal with capitalist contradictions: to so-
cialize the huge losses booked by banks and large firms, change policy instruments,
correct market failures, support regions in decline, transform labor market regula-
tions or createnewmarketswhilst supporting creativedestruction.Crises inspireus
to think in new ways about periods and varieties of capitalism, about regulation
crises and dynamics and about the role, functions and characteristics of the state.
At the same time, crises are a great source of tension, pushing political debates to
the extreme, sparking waves of protest, and generating political pressures or anti-
democratic trends that call into question the very legitimacy of the state.
The 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing recession demonstrate both the power
and the vulnerability of themodern state. Severely buffeted by the economic crisis,
most advanced democracies were forced to take drastic policy measures that often
included hugely expensive public interventions in the private sector, only some of
which have been paid back. Such measures threw the state’s centrality into sharp
focus. Although major recessions have challenged the strength and capacity of the
state, they have not called into question the role of the state as the primary agent
of policy initiatives, nor its legitimate authority to respond to economic crises.
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The current crisis is no exception and has incited the rapid development of
myriad state interventions, both internally and in relation to other states: active
policy responses have been deployed across the world, from China and Brazil to
the USA. In Europe, states are paying a huge price to support their banks (Woll,
in press), and many Southern and Western European countries, under intense
pressure from other states and market actors, have taken unprecedented austerity
in response to the ongoing European fiscal crisis.
There are also other fundamental changes occurringwithin states. A large strand
of political economy research has been devoted to examining the ways in which
states have restructured extensively in response to globalization, changing societies,
and other phenomena, such as the worsening of long-term fiscal crises or imple-
mentation failures. The reach of the state is growing in certain fields, such as audit-
ing, market making or penalizing; it is retreating in others. Whilst some scholars
evoke a new phase of the Weberian state and others point to the emergence of
neoliberal governmentality, most of us remain slightly confused.
Indeed, what is happening to the state—both to specific states and the state in
general—is the subject of a massive, disputed and perplexing literature. For in-
stance, sessions devoted to Brazil at the SASE conference in Milan characterized
the Brazilian state as complex, hybrid, developmental, post-developmental, neo-
liberal, soft neoliberal, multilevel . . . and difficult to conceptualize. Indeed! (The
same may be said for more countries than Brazil.) Social scientists in particular
have shown themselves to be endlessly creative in their quest to qualify the state,
putting forward a remarkable list of adjectives to characterize the state’s many
forms, functions and dynamics. These include corporatist, managerial, develop-
mental, welfare, warfare, workfare, punishing, hollowed out, regulatory, post-
military, obsolete, submerged, standardizing, constrained, activist, technological,
virtual, repleted, post-statist, carceral, retreating, unsustainable, cosmopolitan,
failed, post-modern and, most recently, post-neoliberal (Grugel and Riggirozzi,
2013). It remains to be seen whether inventing labels leads to clear analytical
insights. The state question is not just about political order; it is also about contra-
dictions, failures, democratic contest, economiccrisis, climate change, surveillance,
war, fragmentation, reform—statesmaybe here to stay, but they are not the same as
they once were.
Ongoing conceptual debates about the nature of the state and what constitutes
statehood are both intimidating and fascinating. The rise of non-positivist
approaches to the state that include state trajectories in different parts of the
world is both intellectually stimulating and puzzling (Migdal, 2009; Vu, 2010;
King andLeGale`s, 2011). But for the sakeof this article, the statewill be understood
in a more classic sense of the term: a political form intended to be permanent; a
complex set of interdependent, relatively differentiated and legitimate institutions;
autonomous; based in a defined territory; and recognized as a state by other states.
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Here, the state is also characterized by its administrative capacity to steer, govern a
society, establish constraining rules, solve conflict, exercise authority, protect citi-
zens andmakewar.Additionally, contemporary states arepart of a capitalist system:
they set and guarantee property rights, guarantee exchanges and organize econom-
ic development by taxing and concentrating resources. The state has taken different
shapes in different eras and different countries: it has no absolute form and may
evenbe consideredanarrativeor a legitimizingmyth. Furthermore, keydimensions
of state activitymay be ‘submerged’ or hidden, that is,made invisible for citizens to
develop state capacity without facing citizen hostility (Mann, 1984; Levi 2002;
Jessop, 2007; Mettler, 2011).
The article argues that the contemporary transformations of states are related to
processes of changing scales, particularly supra-national and infra-national pro-
cesses. Critical urban scholars have written extensively about the organization of
societies on different scales. They emphasized the tensions created by mobility,
pressures of capital and political logics (Brenner, 1999). Depending on the scale
atwhich societies are organized, theymaybecomemoreor less structured and insti-
tutionalized over time as a result of integrating, centralizing and embedding
culture, the economy and the making of a social and political order. This led to
what Michael Mann (2013b) has called ‘uncaging’ of citizens and networks.
Whilst Mann sees uncaging as a possible but very limited process, this article
pays tribute to the exceptional work of this great British sociologist from UCLA
and his formidable four-volume work titled Sources of Social Power, particularly,
the last two volumes published in 2013 dealing with the twentieth century.
Whilst Mann (1997) was famously sceptical about the impact of globalization on
the retreat of the state, this article deals with Europe and identifies three types of
processes: the uncaging of society, the de-nationalization of society isolating
economic policy from democracy and the rise of infra-national territories.
2. States caging societies
In historical terms, a world of empires, fiefdoms, city-states, religious realms and
pirates became a world of states, and often nation-states (Spruyt, 2009). The na-
tional scale tookagreatdealof time to emerge anddid soagainst abackdropof com-
peting groups, particularly elites (Lachman, 2010). States evolved through aprocess
of territorial unification, inwhich borderswere stabilized so that authority could be
exercised over a given population. The territorial question is both central to and
dependent on the scale at which social, cultural, economic and political spheres
are organized and on how visions of these spheres are deployed. Particularly in
Europe, classic accounts of the emergence of the modern state are replete with
accounts of conquests, battles and wars. This is the fiscal military paradigm identi-
fiedbyCharles Tilly. But territorial unificationhas also taken amorepacific road: in
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the cases of Italy and Germany, Ziblatt (2006) has shown how national elites nego-
tiated with regional elites characterized by important political.
Throughout the twentieth century, differences of language, social structure, ter-
ritories and culture eroded as the nation-state grew stronger, with the advent of
public policy, conflict resolution mechanisms and the nationalization of politics
and society. As James Scott argued in Seeing Like a State(1998), if societies were
to be rationalized and governed, they had to be made ‘legible’ and standardized
(see also King and Lieberman, 2009).
DevelopingWeber’s conception of social closure, scholars such asMann (1986),
Brubaker (1992) andBartolini (2005)have identifiedprocesses throughwhich state
elites consolidated their control over societies on a given territory; first, the closure
of borders and second, the strengtheningof interdependences among social groups.
Closing borders helped differentiate inside from outside andmake exit more diffi-
cult for groups and firms. Differentiation grew more acute with time, playing out
most intensely duringwars. At the same time, the closure of borders prevents exter-
nal forces from participating in the way the national political order is structured.
Historically, national elites have attempted to curb transnational movements
such as international socialism or religious hierarchies (Catholicism in France,
for example) and embed certain organized groups within national hierarchies to
counter the influence of international capitalism.
Once an internal order has been organized and a national society homogenized,
interdependence among social groups was strengthened through institutions,
culture, standardization, public policy (e.g., transport, education, social welfare),
redistribution, language, industrialization and war. The interdependence this fos-
tered among different classes and status groups promoted social cohesion and rein-
forced the feeling of belonging to a nation. Over time, in addition to establishing
national cleavages, state institutions organized everything from the extraction of
resources to the centralization of administrations, politics and social relations
(Crouch, 1992, 1999; Dyson, 2010), and in this way established themore or less na-
tional societies we know today. Intense warfare and the rise of the welfare state in-
tensified this process through the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the
twentieth century.
The social compromise forged after World War II gave this model new
vigour. European industrial capitalist societies were organized around the state,
its citizens’ rights and its institutions. Public expenditures related to the welfare
state increased dramatically in Europe from 8% to 9% of the national revenue at
the beginning of the twentieth century to 45% to 55% in continental Europe
today (Piketty, 2013).
Michael Mann provided his own version of the argument when he developed
the concept of the ‘caging’ of people withinmodern nation-states (Mann, 1993),
which he understood as the containment of communities and political ties
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within confined social and territorial boundaries.1 Twokey caging processeswere
central in the making of the modern state according to Mann: the economic
process and the political process. In other words, Mann argues (2013b, p. 139):
‘In the course of their self protection, citizens became more caged within their
nation states, while nationally regulated economies erected defenses against
the insecurities produced by capitalism’ and that during the twentieth century
‘we have seen warfare and welfare tightening the caging of citizens by the
nation states, at the same time bringing them onstage’. Of course the caging of
society was never complete, but national societies in Europe did become more
different from each other.
3. Uncaging people, firms and groups and the undermining of state’s
infrastructural power
The caging processes that became so powerful over the twentieth century led to a
transformation of states. Weberian and legal definitions of the state have put
forward the claim for the monopoly of violence, borders, the legal system, the ter-
ritory andmost important the institutions (including the courts and the agencies)
and their degree of centralization. But the rise of public expenditure has massively
increased the activities of the states, the government part with the production and
implementation of public policies. To come back toMann, he (1986, p. 113) argues
that the ‘infrastructural power of the state’ defined as ‘the capacity of the state ac-
tually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions
throughout the realms’ has become massive.
What happens to states if the infrastructural power is under question? People,
firms, groups or societies are escaping the boundaries of the state, undermining
the dual economic and political processes of caging. This has implications for
how states become reconfigured. Arguments about the uncaging of people, firms
and groups are well known. The state is not the container of society anymore; the
dual process (closure and growing interdependence) raising the cost of exit is
undermined in all sorts of ways. Globalization and critical urban geography scho-
lars have done a lot of work to analyse changing scales, the crisis of territoriality and
the reconfiguration of state as suggested by Brenner: ‘the current round of global-
ization has significantly reconfigurated or at least undermined, the container-like
qualities of states’ (Brenner, 1999, p. 40; also Badie, 1995).
Transnationalism has been defined as the significant intensification of
border-crossing relations, communications, networks and interactions for both
work and social reasons, as well as to the growing presence of international
1As is well knownMann defines society in terms of overlapping and intersecting power networks related
to four sources of power: ideological, economic, military and political.
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references in everyday practices, societal systems and regulations (Mau et al., 2008).
Those developments make social groups, firms and individuals within the nation-
state less interdependent from each other. It has become easier for many (but not
all) to be more transnationally mobile. Groups are less interdependent from each
other, and territorial boundaries do not prevent increasingmobility. It has become
easier to choose exit over voice or loyalty, to return to Hirschman’s terms. Long-
term trends in immigration are bringing increased cultural and ethnic diversity
to more and more cities and states. As immigration studies have shown at
length, integration or assimilation models become less realistic as individuals
becomemore transnational,maintaining physical and virtual ties to their countries
of origin and returning home, temporarily or permanently, with greater ease.
Global theorists such as Urry, Beck, Appadurai and Giddens argue that various
processes are becoming less embedded in the nation-state: cultural practices,
images and representations; socialmovements (particularly global ones such as en-
vironmental and human rights movements); and of course capitalism itself (or at
least its vanguard forces). Beck and Sznaider (2006) suggest that cosmopolitanism
and elitemembership is not a conscious or voluntary individual choice but the con-
sequence of an irreversible trendwhereby relations at the global level are intensified,
mostly throughproduction and consumptionbehaviours. It dilutes the boundaries
of national societies and makes more visible the actual and irreversible patterns of
interdependence among societies.
Despite the empirical limits of those broad claims related to globalization, em-
pirical research does suggest a ‘globalization of minds’ amongst the middle classes
(Andreotti et al., 2013). The role of supranational influence in social change is
evident in analyses of the transnationalisation of Germany, or Europeanmobilities
(Favell and Recchi, 2009) and interactions (Favell andGuiraudon, 2011). Evidence
of local lives changed by global transformations (Kennedy, 2010) is given by re-
search by studies on mobility (including the less mobile) (e.g., Urry, 2007), trans-
national networks and diasporas.
It is only logical that national political orders take into account external influ-
ences such as international capital, immigrant transnational networks, foreign re-
ligious influences, transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the
existence of international norms, standards and rankings. Such actors and norms
are used to compare, rank, criticize or produce alternative knowledge and in the
process may undermine the legitimacy of existing national elites in different
domains, frompolitics to culture. Universities are an excellent example of this phe-
nomenon. External influences may undermine the capacity of the state to control
andmobilize its population and impose its own norms. Thus, they ultimately limit
its capacity to govern and use their infrastructural power, to use Mann’s concept.
Many public policy failures may be explained in those terms. The capacity of the
state to govern firms and individuals has also been called into question. Beyond
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issues of mobility, the scale of tax evasion by firms through the ‘optimization’ of
fiscal strategy and the boom of fiscal paradises are evidence of the magnitude
of exit strategies. As one website offering tax advice puts it, ‘Evading taxes is
illegal, but avoiding paying unnecessary tax is one of the keys to building wealth.’
(http://www.investopedia.com/video/play/tax-avoidance-vs-tax-evasion/ September
2013).2
Our point here is not to show how increasingly fluid the world is but to expose
the mechanisms undermining the logic of states caging societies due to external
influences, circulations, flows and networks. Because globalization facilitates mo-
bility, various forms of exit become more likely and easy. Interdependence among
social groups is also weakened by the absence of war andmassive industrialization.
Globalization trends allow groups and organizations with resources to spread their
influence, look for new markets, develop horizontal networks and negotiate their
involvement in national societies.
The world of free-floating individuals remains limited to a tiny group of people,
but particularly strong amongst elites, who are becoming at least partly trans-
national (Fligstein, 2008; Recchi, 2013). The ‘uncaging’ of elites groups, who are
more likely to exit, is of particular relevance when studying the state (Lachman,
2010). Increasing transnational mobility and transactions would appear to
produce social differentiation processes and play a role in restructuring the social
hierarchies within national societies (Savage et al., 2005). In a more Marxist vein,
Sklair (2001) has argued that members of what he calls the transnational capitalist
class seek to project images of themselves as both ‘citizens of the world’ as well as of
their places and/or countries of birth—the latter despite their shared lifestyles, pat-
terns of higher education, consumption of luxury goods and services and dynamics
of residential segregation.
Whilst major cultural and social conflicts of interest are increasingly structured
at the global scale, not all individuals or social groups within nation-states are
affected by it with the same intensity. Empirical studies show that twoverydifferent
social groups are experiencing and taking advantage of this newmobility: low-wage
migrant workers and the upper social strata of the population. The latter category
have at times been described as the ‘hypermobile elite’, composed largely of man-
agers and other professionals with high levels of economic, educational and
social capital, who spend their time shuttling among global cities (Elliott and
Urry, 2010). As was the case during the rise of the nation-state and the initial
2Figures vary.TheUSsenate evaluated taxevasionby individuals andfirmsatUS$100billion ayear in the
USA, whereas Oxfam estimated the amount of money kept in tax shelters to be about $12 trillion; in a
2013 report it estimated that individual tax evasion worldwide amounted to aroundE100 billion. The
TaxAvoidance JusticeNetworkestimates global taxevasionat £3 trillionyearly,with£69billion in theUK
alone. This has become a common theme a the G8 and G20 summits, and the OECD is working on the
issue of transparency. See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/fightingtaxevasion.htm.
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stages of capitalist development, this new elite is much less nationally oriented,
coming as it does from the urban upper or upper-middle classes. Indeed, it takes
advantage of this newfound transnational mobility to challenge existing national
elites, push for differentmodernization projects and promote their own ambitions
and interests. Elites gain latitude by taking advantage of a multilevel world to limit
pressure from national democratic forces or interest groups. The case of the EU is
illuminating to redefine statehood in those terms.
4. The denationalization of political authority: redefining statehood
by EU membership and elite isolation from democratic pressure
States themselves are also increasingly involved in transnational networks, consti-
tuting supra-national entity at the European or world scale. But global processes do
not live on their own. They materialize in territories, including national ones
(Sassen, 2006).
The argument about various forms of globalization has been stressed many
times by scholars of international political economy and international relations.
They have pointed out the forms of transnational governance that emerged as
the result of the decline of statemonopolies, the rise of transnational firms and pri-
vatization processes, the transnationalization of actors and flows, including both
public andprivate organisations, andnorm setting byNGOs and socialmovements
(Sassen, 2006; Djelic and Quack, 2010).
Froman IRperspective,Genshel andZangl (2011) analyze thedenationalization
of political authority, organizations, activities, resources and instruments, particu-
larly fields such as economic development and defence. Transnational, private and
international actors play an ever-increasing role in imposing norms from outside
the nation-state. Nation-states have lost their monopoly over political authority
and are now becoming itsmanagers, who coordinate among and provide resources
such as legitimacy forother groups of actors.However, states remain the only actors
with ‘general’ legitimacy when it comes to exercising political authority, and most
other transnational actors must with the state one way or another. In other words,
the state ‘remains the central node of a more and more decentralized authority
structure’ (Genschel and Zangl, 2011, p. 531).
Just what role the EU and the European integration process has played in the
transformationof the state is the subject of extensivedebate, andone that is particu-
larly germane to my argument. Contesting the neo-functionalists, Alan Milward
(2000) famously claimed that the EU came to ‘the rescue of the nation states’,
and a never-ending debate rages between those who see the EU as primarily an
association of autonomous states and those who perceive it as a kind of federal
state in themaking.There is nowa robust literatureon stateweakeningmechanisms
and the migration of authority from the nation-state to the EU through courts,
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norms and policies. By contrast, Bruszt (2002) has provided ample evidence in
Eastern Europe of state-making mechanisms that may be explained by the dynam-
ics of EU integration, including norms and institutions and the strengthening of
market-making institutions.All over Europe, a significant state-building apparatus
has been put in place to respond to European agencies, regulations, courts and
interest groups. The EUmay have a centrifugal effect on states, but it has also pro-
foundly transformed the way states and their elites operate in a number of fields
(Sweet et al., 2001). In particular, after the Delors period, the rise of the European
regulatory state has led to a new round of institution-building (most notably
through regulation agencies) to regulate variousmarkets and forms of competition
amongst states. Bruzst (2002) argues two additional factors have affected Eastern
European states; first, the structural funds allocated to those states, which, as is
also true in the southofEurope, explains the buildingof subnational state capacities
tomanage funds and implement policies; and second, criteria for eastern European
countries’ accession to Europe, in addition to pushing them to complywith human
rights standards, requires them to build their capacity to withstand pressure from
competitions.Whathas happened inTurkey is a good example of this. Although the
EU has shown reluctance with regards to Turkish accession, the Turkish state is
effecting large-scale change to meet membership criteria, progressively modifying
agencies, indicators, norms and standards.
The EUmay thus be considered a major force for transforming states, although
its transformations may be seen in very different ways. In the field of law, the con-
trast between France and Britain is striking: British lawyers lament that the trad-
itional British system of common law has been infected with the virus of
Continental public law, a classic pillar of the state (Loughlin, 2010). Meanwhile,
on the other side of the English Channel, French lawyers bemoan the erosion of
the Frenchpublic and administrative law systemunder threat fromthe internation-
al norms and standards of the private law imposed by Brussels (Caillosse, 2008). In
some ways, the EU’s norm setting may be seen as a reflection or an adaptation to
global law (Cassese, 2006, 2011). He argues that the rise of administrative non-
governmental agencies will soon make international administrative public law a
reality.
Despite the strength of actually existing ‘states,’ the same conceptmight disguise
a profound transformation, a state first defined by its interactions with the EU of
global governance institutions as suggested by Chris Bickerton (2012). He argues
that states in Europe have been profoundly transformed by the EU, despite the
fact that European integration is a state-driven process. Building on the findings
of John Dunn and Quentin Skinner, he perceives the development of the state in
the EU as an answer to claims of popular sovereignty, in that representation is an
elitist process (Manin, 1996) and constitutions (not least the US Constitution)
are in part designed to prevent radical popular movements from co-opting their
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states’ capacity to transform society. In other words, the congruence of nation,
democratic system and state should be considered an exception, not a rule.
Europe nation-state elites attempt to escape from the pressure of their populations,
and becoming an EU member state is one way to do this, hence his definition of
states defined by their membership of the EU:
[A member-state is] a distinctive kind of state where national power is
exercised in concert with others. National executives seek to bind them-
selves and their own domestic publics through a growing body of rules
and norms created by national governments in their ongoing and in-
creasingly complex policymaking activities at the EU level. . . . The
paradox is that member statehood is thus the way in which political
power is exercised by national governments but in ways that appear ex-
ternal to and far removed from the national societies over whom these
governments rule. . . . In their place we have seen a strengthening of the
relations between national executives at the pan-European level. This
was pursued initially as a strategy for weakening the hold of domestic
actors on the policymaking process but it has become over time a
source of authority for national governments lacking points of connec-
tion with their domestic societies. (Bickerton, 2012, p. 4)
That’s a quite compelling argument to understand the relationship between
democratic crisis and state transformation in Europe. Insightfully, Bickerton
emphasizes the fact that the relationship between state and society should be
seen in relative terms, as oneof the state’smanydimensions, and argues that nation-
al governments have actively dismantled some of rights and responsibilities that
structure the relationship between a state and its people. He suggests that ‘member
statehood’ is not without contradictions: although states’ commitments, obliga-
tions, rights and duties allow them to gain resources, authority and strength
through close links among core national executives all over Europe, ‘national pol-
itical actors are more insulated from domestic social procedures’ and in this way
relinquish some elements of sovereignty.
This does notmean that the relationship between state and society is abandoned
butorganizedby supra-national normsandpressures. Pressures fromexternal rules
and norms are particularly striking in relation to the crisis and austerity policies.
Whilst the current crisismay lead to the restructuring of the state, this restructuring
should also be linked to past three decades (Streeck, 2009). During this period neo-
liberalism became if not hegemonic then at least dominant and influential within
states. Pressures abound to limit the role of the state in the economy and society in
general, and thenearly exclusive recourse to the expertiseofneoclassical economists
in governance matters has set precise parameters for state intervention.
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For instance, inGovernments versusMarkets: The Changing Economic Role of the
State, former IMFdirector and economist Vito Tanzi presentswhat he claims is ‘the
first comprehensive treatment available in the literature of the economic role of the
state in a historical and world perspective’ (2012). Though couched in terms of a
search for the optimal size of the state, the book is actually a ferocious critique of
the expansion of state expenditures in the twentieth century, at the expense of
‘reduced individual freedom’ (p. 17), when ‘for much of recorded history (until
the 20th century), the world did not have governments that taxed their citizens
at high rates and spent the money to finance public programs.’ No doubt the
working class shares Tanzi’s regret for the good old days of feudal times or the nine-
teenth century! Our leading world expert in public economics offers this solution:
‘The abolitionof the government programsby reducing public spendingwould sig-
nificantly and progressively reduce the need for high taxes’ (p. 21). The circular
(non)logic of this normative wisdom is proffered in the name of optimizing the
size of the state. Tanzi finds Nozick’s position in Anarchy, State, and Utopia a
‘little bit extreme’, and would accept a kind of ‘paternalistic libertarian approach’
to encourage the rational behavior of individuals—as long as it does not cost
much. State spending is bad, he reckons, and he cheers the transformation of the
financial crisis into a fiscal crisis, touting it as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity
to justify massive cuts in public spending, and thus put an end to an evil force
working against individual freedom. He claims the search for the optimal size of
the state is not apolitical but a deeply political process that should be taken seriously
to promote a low-tax economy burdened by minimal state intervention. But, as
many arguing in the tradition of Hayek have posited, politics in the form of popu-
lism or state capture by organized interests is also the enemy, since a good economy
requires good laws and markets.
There are two possible solutions to the problems raised by this line of argument.
The first is to promote austerity, an old idea that Mark Blyth has eloquently
debunked:
Austerity is a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts
through the reduction of wages, prices and public spending to restore
competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the
state’s budget, debts, and deficits. Doing so, its advocates believe, will
inspire ‘business confidence’ since the government will neither be
‘crowding out’ the market for investment by sucking up all the available
capital through the issuance of debt, not adding the nation’s already ‘too
big debt’. (Blyth, 2013, p. 2)
Austerity policy allowsanation’s elected representatives to justifymassive cuts in
public spending by citing debt and fiscal crisis. Streeck and Mertens (2013) have
given ample evidence of how the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’ leads to the decline of
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state capacity, stating, ‘As a growing share of public spending goes to pensioners, on
the one hand, and rentiers on the other –to pay the debt- the space for democratic
politics to serve competing claimsby lesswell protectedgroupsmust shrink’ (p. 29).
The second solution is for states to abandonpublic spending and intervention in
favor of regulation. Public choice scholars have long argued that regulations (law
and economics) should govern society, rather than high taxes, public expenditures
and, worse, redistribution. The rise of the regulatory state (Moran, 2003) can be
traced to the emergence of several phenomena, but most germane tomy argument
is the way it disconnects elected representatives and the making and implementa-
tion of policy. At the state level, this leads tomore fragmentation and less control by
elected representatives. The mix of regulation, ‘agencification’ and privatization,
promoted most notably byMargaret Thatcher, aims to isolate the political dimen-
sions of the policy-making process from its implementation, which is done by
experts. The rise of EUagencies shows this process in action and has generated net-
works of experts who are more and more disconnected from their national con-
stituencies.
Austerity policies have been put in place by existing elites working in close net-
works: in the USA and in Europe, former bankers have played a crucial role in
designing new regulations and governing the economy. The pressure they have
exerted on classic democracies wasmost acute inGreece but has been felt elsewhere
in Europe as well. The influence of these elites is also visible in the dream of ‘auto-
matic instruments’ (Weaver, 1989), such as constitutional limits to budget deficits
or benefits and redistribution that disappear automatically if certain criteria arenot
met. This raises numerous questions for democratic theory, and as Mair (2013,
p. 164) puts it, underscores ‘the growing gap between responsiveness and respon-
sibility—or between what citizens might like governments to do and what govern-
ments are obliged to do—and the declining capacity of parties to bridge ormanage
that gap’.
Somewould argue that thismix of austerity and regulations is a newway to cage
societies imposedbyneoliberal or capitalist globalized elites, andone that raises sig-
nificant questions about our existing democracies. This is only part of the story,
however: these transformations are also the result of a long-term rationalization
process of the state, as well as an attempt to help state elites find failsafe ways to im-
plement policy.
5. States reconfigured by the decline of hard politics and
decentralization of political authority
All classic accounts of the state stress the protection of individuals, the claim to the
monopoly of violence and the state security apparatus. In war and the periods
leading up to it, military groups are central elites of the state. However, Perry
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Anderson (1994) and Michael Mann (1997) have put forward a robust thesis to
contradict this idea, arguing that domestic coercion was relaxed following World
War II, which marked the end of armed conflict among European nation-states.
No longer mobilized to the same extent by the imperatives of war or preparation
for it, states have tended to let territorial differentiation processes simply unfold,
allowing social and political actors unprecedented autonomy. The development
of relatively post-militarist tendencies (as compared, for example, with the
period between 1850 and 1945) has lessened coercion, leaving the field open for
the decline of what Mann calls ‘hard politics’; that is, politics defined in terms of
control and domination in a context of possible war. According to Anderson,
this was the prime logic driving decentralization all over Europe.3 The relative
decline of war in some parts of the world has long-term consequences for the
state’s capacity to govern and mobilize. Mann (2013b, p. 419) explains how the
decline of war in the world goes together with the decline of war-making capacity,
meaning that nation-states in Europe and beyond ‘no longer retain their military
backbone’.
Classically, authority has been described as a capacity to make and implement
policy decisions (requiring organization, negotiation and resources) and deploy
norms that legitimize those decisions to ensure citizens’ acquiescence. In European
states and beyond, authority has progressively migrated from the center to the
meso-level, in the process reinforcing the autonomy of subnational territories be-
coming more autonomous from the state. In Europe, the need to mobilize for war
has become less central and legitimate. At the same time, the state has loosened its
grip on subnational territories, transferring resources and authority to federal or
quasi-federal states, regions and cities (Le Gale`s 2002; Keating, 2013).
In its first phase, the rise of regionalist movements was characterized by cultural
resistance to national goals, in general driven by regional inequalities or marginal-
ization: Flanders, Scotland,Wales, the Basque country and Corsica are a few exam-
ples of this well-documented phenomenon. Moves to decentralize, federalize or
delegate state power were driven by pressures from state elites to improve public
service delivery and implementation whilst resolving conflicts at the regional
level. In the 1970s, this rationalist approach by state elites also led to the ‘decentral-
ization of scarcity’; in other words, high-cost public services or public policy man-
agement were decentralized as a way to delegate budget cuts or reductions.
In its second phase, which came in the 1990s, decentralization came out of the
mobilization of a rising ‘regionalism of the rich’.Wealthy urban regions demanded
more autonomy and protested redistribution to poorer regions in the name of the
economic competition promoted by the EU. Catalonia, northern Italy, Bavaria and
3This argument is only partial because it does not take into account the reconfiguration of the state
security apparatus, surveillance and exercise of violence.
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to some extent Scotland are all examples of this phenomenon. Legal and fiscal
resources garnered from ongoing reforms aimed at federalization, delegation, or
decentralization helped strengthen the role of cities and regions as political
actors in the European arena. Keating (2013) has analysed the rise of competitive
regionalism, looking at competitive federalism in Germany, quasi-federalism in
Spain, and the beginnings of regionalism in Italy. Whilst the EU has to some
extent sidelined regional policy in favor of competition policy, nation-states have
on the whole been less direct in their interventionist strategy, preferring a ‘hands-
off ’ approach.
As a result, subnational politics now resembles a mosaic in most countries, fea-
turing overlapping levels of governance, networks of local and regional political
actors and diverse combination of public policies. According the OECD, central
government spending as a percentage of public spending is less than 20% in
federal states such as Germany or Belgium; around 35% in Scandinavia, France
or Italy; and approximately 70% in the most centralized countries, such as the
UK. The past half-century has seen massive transfers of expertise, knowledge and
resources take place in Europe. Normative orders are created below the state.
First, secession claims in some places are a renewed threat to the state’s borders
and sovereignty. Nationalist movements in Flanders, Catalonia and Scotland have
exerted increasing pressure over time, gaining resources and political skill and
winning elections that have allowed them to participate in regional governance;
they are now trying to organize referenda that would grant them independence
or, more likely, large-scale autonomy. Until the 2008 crisis, the idea of a Europe
of small, competitive states (such as Iceland, Ireland or Finland) was popular in re-
gional circles; since then the near bankruptcy of Iceland, Ireland and Greece has
made this option less attractive.
Second, within each member state, political differentiation is increasing due to
the mobilizations already described, as well as greater diversity in service delivery
and changing forms of state regulation. The intermediate level—which, depending
on the context, maymean themetropolitan, regional or federal level—is responsible
for more resources, manages more policies, has more autonomy and is more
involved in horizontal transnational networks than ever before. Countries around
the globe are experimenting with the decentralization of power, granting newfound
autonomy or special legal standing to certain territories or allowing them to regulate
policies in new ways. Conflict-resolution mechanisms are also being decentralized,
and the day-to-day management of conflicts among ethnic, cultural or religious
groups is nowusually done at the local or regional level. The centralizedmajoritarian
structure of the state no longer seems like the way forward for ‘strong’ states and has
become the exception, not the rule (Paul et al., 2003).
Third, whilst some territories are gaining influence, others are becoming more
andmoremarginalized in economic and social terms.TheEUand itsmember states
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are showing less capacity (or at least less political willingness) to reduce these in-
equalities. The process is not about uncaging but gradual marginalization. The
slow decline of the de-industrialized north of England is now largely accepted
amongst political elites in London, and the Mezzogiorno, however diverse it may
have become (Trigilia, 2012), is falling behind the rest of Italy (and Europe) accord-
ing tomost indicators. InEasternEurope, too, inequalities betweenmajor cities and
the rest of the country are rising. This runs counter to the original project of the
modern state, which sought to integrate, standardize and decrease inequalities
across territories. Large, rich metropolitan areas such as London or Paris become
hubs for circulation, migration, wealth production, culture and finance. Conse-
quently, states have reshaped their policies to enhance the international competitive
edge of these cities, fashioning them as ‘national champions’ and supporting them
accordingly (Crouch and Le Gale`s, 2012). Whilst London is still British, it has also
become a formidable multicultural center, attracting investors, visitors, migrants
and wealthy residents from around the world. Many London establishments
accept payments in dollars and euros as well as pounds. Culturally Paris or Brussels
seem closer to London than Bradford and take the same time to reach by train.
Whilst these major cities have not exited their nation-states, they are more struc-
tured by international patterns of circulation are embedded within national struc-
tures and institutions (Taylor, 1994).
The rise of cities and regions would, for all these reasons, seem to point tomore
autonomy from the state. Centralization is being renewed by state elites, in particu-
lar through the controls and regulations being developed by many finance minis-
tries (Peters, 2008; Le Gale`s and Scott, 2010). All the same, increasing regional
autonomy and greater latitude with regards to policy have caused tensions to pro-
liferate within nation-states. In both federal and highly centralized states, constitu-
tional courts are being called on more often to settle disputes between the state’s
central and intermediate levels over the legal or financial status of various policies.
6. Conclusion
The article argues that amongst other processes, those related to rescaling societies
and capitalism are changing some key parameters of statehood (Brenner, 2004).
Classic parameters of statehood, including territoriality, elites, centralization or
the monopoly of violence, are being redefined in relation to other levels of govern-
ance, transnational flux and networks.
The classic debate about globalization of the state led to contrasting positions.
Michael Mann (1997) makes a compelling argument about the continuity of the
state in eras of globalization.Mann’s (2013a, p. 136) comments about globalization
are something of a cold shower: ‘In itself, globalization has no distinctive content
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other than its range. Globalization does not do anything . . . for it is merely the
product of expansions of the sources of social power’.4
Similarly, law-inspired scholars andWeberians have not been shy to suggest that
states are robust institutions and symbolic entities based on law, protecting indivi-
duals within a given territory (DuGay and Scott, 2010). In this reading, the welfare
state or various activities associated with the Keynesian state are seen as secondary
to the state itself, and may therefore be restructured without any consequences for
the state. In parallel, a robust body of research has emphasized the continuity of the
state. The current era is characterized less by the hollowing out of the state than by
the strengthening of large states, hence the example of states with over 100 million
inhabitants, such as India, China, Russia, Brazil, Japan and the USA, whose ranks
are being joined by Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Mexico, among others.
Regarding the state’s relationship to capitalism, Linda Weiss (1998, 2010) has cri-
ticized the ‘myth of the powerless state’, whilst others have underscored the range
of activities throughwhich the state remains interventionist, either to discipline so-
cieties, as in Jessop’smodel of the globalizedSchumpeterianfinancialworkfare state
(Jessop, 2002) or through market making (Levy, 2006) and entrepreneurial activ-
ities (Mazzucato, 2013).
By contrast, a vast literature has emerged linking globalization processes to the
decline of state (or, as the case may be, the erosion, obsolescence, hollowing out,
fragmentation, retreat, failure, etc.). Globalization processes, including the global-
izationof capitalism,were expected tomake the state obsolete, unable to control the
flow of capital, services and so on (Held andMacgrew, 1993; Urry, 2000). In differ-
ent ways, international political economists such as Susan Strange and leading
SASE scholars such as Wolfgang Streeck or Colin Crouch (amongst others), and
Marxist scholars such as David Harvey, have all emphasized this diminishing cap-
acity of the state to control globalizing capitalism and the resulting decline in its
capacity to govern or assert infrastructural power or the crisis of the fiscal state
(Streeck and Mertens, 2013).
The article aimed at identifying some processes through which the transform-
ation of European states is taking place beyond the question of continuity or
radical change. It does not suffice to argue that many globalized processes are
related to the state. The progressive uncaging of citizens, groups andfirms is under-
mining the infrastructural power of the state related to its capacity to penetrate
society, control its population or steer economic flux. Policy failures and pressure
from regions and cities are leading to institutional changes. The denationalization
of political authority may leave the state at the centre, but that’s not the same state
known from the Weberian ideal-type. Statehood is being redefined in relation
4For a critique of globalization theory, see Mann (2013b, introduction) The great exception for him is
climate change.
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to external pressures and norms, some of them related to the EU or global govern-
ance institutions or neoliberal ideas with the effect of loosening the links between
the state and democratic politics.
The article argues that the rescaling of societies and capitalism are leading to the
transformation of the state. Political geographer and critical and neo-Marxist
urban scholars have in particular stressed this transformation of statehood
(Agnew, 1994; Taylor, 1994; Brenner, 1999, 2004; Jessop, 2002, 2007). If the global-
ization of capitalism is a major part of this story and a decisive engine of change,
globalization takesmany forms and combinesmore contradictory and diverse pro-
cesses. Globalizations (both globalized capitalism and globalization in its other
forms), Europeanization and decentralization have all changed the scale on
whichvarious social spheres are organized. This in turn has led the state to lose cap-
acity and retreat in some areas and has altered the differentiation process of state
elites; at the same time, transnational actors, flows and circulation have dismantled
or radically altered the existing social and political order. At the same time, states
retain vast and original resources, and whilst some are under threat, they are far
from collapse. Policies are being developed to deal with the new environment,
manage internationalized networks, support and control various groups, exercise
politicalauthority inmorenegotiatedwayordisciplinesociety as itadapts to thepres-
suresofglobalization.States aremore involved inpolicymaking thaneverbefore, and
their legitimacy depends on results they achieve, which are now measured in com-
parative terms. However, globalization is not the only factor behind state restructur-
ing, which is also driven by internal factors such as long-term rationalization
processes andby the impact of policies—someneoliberal, others not—on state insti-
tutions. Furthermore,whilst the declining importance ofwar inEuropehas led to the
extensive restructuringof the state’s securityapparatus, theprotectionofcitizensorat
least the claim of doing so remains a seeming cornerstone of state legitimacy.
Fromall this, wemay conclude that a different kind of state is in themaking: one
equippedwith awide varietyof new instruments and technologies. Reconfigured to
confront the forces of capitalism as well as changes in form and scale, the state is
becomingmore transnational, differentiated andmanagerial. It is more structured
by networks and external norms, but also more internally contested by differen-
tiated societies and mosaics of territories. The classic post-war state is losing
ground (Streeck, 2009). The processes of transformation of European states must
be analysed in relation to the crisis, to neoliberalism and to capitalism (Berneo
and Pontusson, 2012; Scha¨fer and Streeck, 2013; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013),
but at the same time, profound rationalization dynamics are in progress to
recover some capacity in some sectors and renewed forms of protest, evaluation
and contestations are transforming the exercise of political authority (Bartels,
2007). The territoriality aspect of statehood is only one part of the reconfiguration
in progress.
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